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Key Ingredient in Army 
Leader Development
Graduate School
Maj. George Fust, U.S. Army
Developing adaptive leaders is the bridge to overcoming readiness shortfalls and the unpredictability of future conflicts, and the 
increasingly ambiguous nature of threats in the con-
temporary operating environment coupled with finite 
resources makes leader development a reasonable goal.1 
However, leader development as employed by the Army 
is ambiguous and vague. What type of leader is the 
Army striving to develop? Strategic leaders? Operational 
leaders? What evaluation mechanisms are in place to 
determine if a leader has become more developed in 
responding to ambiguity?2 These questions deserve 
continued debate and understanding but will not be 
the focus here. Instead, this article will tackle one small 
piece of the larger puzzle: graduate-level education.
Rigorous advanced education is a bridge between 
strategic and operational leadership.3 It provides indi-
viduals a greater intellectual tool set for dealing with 
complexity, and it is arguably one of the best institu-
tional opportunities to build strategic thinkers.4 Further, 
advanced education opportunities can “help shape 
strategic leaders” by cultivating a foundation for critical 
thinking.5 The best place to begin this research project 
is by examining the education of the Army’s current 
strategic leaders, those at the three- and four-star level. 
These individuals embody the culture and values of the 
organization. A systematic analysis of one component 
of their career path, graduate school, can provide insight 
into the value placed on it and identify potential short-
comings. Utilizing a robust resume dataset of senior 
officer education contextualizes the data within trends 
in scholarship and Army strategy in order to provide the 
U.S. Army feedback to better understand the results of 
its current graduate school policy. A secondary purpose 
of this study is to identify how to better leverage gradu-
ate school to develop strategic leaders who can then be 
more effective in strategic-level positions.
The Current Leader 
Development Process
A review of the Army’s current leader development 
process will help us understand where graduate school 
can be leveraged to improve strategic thinking. The 
Army defines strategic leaders as representing “a finely 
balanced combination of high-level thinkers, accom-
plished warfighters, and geopolitical military experts.”6 
If we accept that advanced education “fosters breadth 
of view, diverse perspectives, critical and reflective 
analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity 
and uncertainty, and innovative thinking, particularly 
with respect to complex, ill-structured or non-linear 
problems,” then we can conclude it is a necessary step 
to develop strategic leaders.7 The logic follows that any 
shortcomings in the Army’s graduate school application 
will likely result in shortcomings in leader development 
and thus a suboptimal force.8
The Army has made great strides recently to better 
prepare leaders for the changing international environ-
ment. The prioritization of leader development was a 
necessary first step in the process. The visionary insight 
of Gen. Ray Odierno, the thirty-eighth chief of staff 
of the Army, culminated in Army Leader Development 
Strategy 2013 (ALDS 2013).9 The document explains the 
importance of leader development and outlines a plan 
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for the Army to achieve its stated goals. The strategy 
suggests ends, ways, and means alignment and specific 
tools to aid in the process. ALDS 2013 is a great starting 
point for assessing and promoting leader development, 
but it does not go far enough in capturing the impor-
tance of advanced education. Annex E of the document 
does highlight strategic leader ends and ways; however, 
it stops short in institutionalizing strategic thinking 
across the entire force. ALDS 2013 also does not offer 
enough specific details for measuring its effectiveness, 
likely because the document is not intended as a stand-
alone product. The overarching strategy of ALDS 2013 
is nested with other mutually supporting strategies in-
cluding the Army Education Strategy, which is visually 
represented in figure 1 (on page 110).10
As figure 1 indicates, the Army places increasing em-
phasis on education as a career progresses. Therefore, any 
education opportunity has increasing returns on invest-
ment. One can conclude that the sooner an Army leader 
attends graduate school and the more such opportunities 
exist, the better it will be for the Army. The next section 
evaluates the degree to which the Army’s renewed em-
phasis on leader development translates to more grad-
uate school opportunities. But before reviewing those 
Maj. Gen. Robin Fontes (right), then commander of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), meets with Maj. Gen. 
Monawari (far left), commanding general of Afghan Logistics Command, and Brig. Gen. Fahim (second from left), commander of the Afghan 
National Army Material Management Center-Afghanistan on 9 August 2017. Fontes is a 1986 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. She then 
graduated from the University of Washington with a master’s degree in international relations and from the George C. Marshall European Center 
for Security Studies. She speaks Russian, Dari, and Farsi. (Photo courtesy of Sgt. 1st Class E. L. Craig, U.S. Army/CSTC-A)
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results, a look at the larger conversation on strategic 
leader development plans is helpful.
Where the ALDS 2013 falls short, there does exist a 
growing body of literature related specifically to de-
veloping strategic thinkers in the Army. This body of 
research offers insight into why it is important for the 
Army to specify the process and expected outcomes for 
development of strategic leadership. The large volume of 
literature available in the “developing strategic leaders” 
genre is a favorite topic among attendees at the Army’s 
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and in 
military-related publications.11 The key theme among 
these publications is 
that the Army can 
be better at develop-
ing strategic leaders. 
The recommenda-
tions suggest that the 
Army should iden-
tify strategic leaders 
earlier in their career 




should be adjusted to 
better develop strategic 
leadership skills. The 
arguments center on 
the idea that the in-
creasing complexity and interconnectedness of the inter-
national environment is outpacing the antiquated Army 
leader development model. This theme is not unique to 
today’s generation. Articles have been routinely published 
for the past fifty years extolling the inability of the Army 
to keep leader development on pace with contemporary 
affairs.12 In short, what worked in the past will not work 
today. We cannot rely on luck but must instead design a 
system to develop the strategic leaders the Army needs.
An outlier to this plethora of publications argues that 
the Army system is good enough.13 The outlier’s dis-
sertation employs three case studies, only one from the 
modern era, and it lacks empirical evidence. The lack of 
robustness and potential bias of this outlier diminishes 
the potential findings. Of more concern, the paper fails 
to consider that the case studies selected could have been 
lucky (exactly what the larger community argues) or that 
they had the appropriate development for the their time 
period. The paper also fails to adequately differentiate 
varying levels of leadership (operational versus strategic) 
or the subcategories of leader development.
The subcategory of graduate school within the larger 
strategic leader development genre is routinely addressed 
by academics and the military alike. Countless quanti-
tative and qualitative articles have been published with 
varying degrees of effectiveness.14 This article serves as a 
contemporary update that seeks to leverage a new dataset 
and method of identifying senior leader trends. The 
larger body of strategic leader development literature will 
be used to highlight schools of thought related to better 
integrating or reforming how graduate school should be 
employed in the development of Army officers.
Before continuing, it is useful to formally outline the 
definition of the term “strategic leader” as it will be used 
throughout this article. A summary of how the Army 
defines a strategic leader is “a leader who is an expert, not 
only in his own domain of war fighting and leading large 
military organizations, but also in the bureaucratic and 
political environment of the nation’s decision-making 
process.”15 Further, it is important to differentiate a per-
son in a “strategic leadership position” from someone who 
is an actual “strategic leader.”16
Training versus Education
The resounding theme of literature published on the 
topic of Army strategic leader development is clear: the 
Career progression
Entry Exit
As Army experience is gained
Emphasis on training decreases
While emphasis on education increases
Figure 1. Relationship of Experience, 
Training, and Education
(Figure from TRADOC Regulation 350-70, Army Learning Policy and Systems, 2017)
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Army needs strategic leaders but is not doing enough 
to develop them. Arthur T. Coumbe argues in Army 
Officer Development: Historical Context that “the apogee 
of graduate education in the Army took place in 1972,” 
and that “the Army’s commitment to, and emphasis 
upon, fully funded graduate education for officers 
gradually eroded after 1973.”17 A shift in priority by 
Gen. William DePuy in 1973, “one that subordinates 
intellectual and strategic astuteness to tactical and op-
erational expertise,” is what led to the cultural shift and 
decline in graduate school attendance.18 Are we still 
operating under the same culture despite rhetoric de-
claring leader development is the priority? If the leader 
development focus is tactical and operational leader-
ship, then the Army is on the right track. If, however, 
the shift is toward education, then steps must be taken 
to increase graduate school opportunities.
Jeffrey McCausland and Gregg Martin argued in 
a 2001 Parameters article that there is a “significant 
qualitative difference” between “training” and “edu-
cation.”19 They go on to explain that “education is all 
about teaching how to think and what the questions 
ought to be …. Training is most frequently used 
when the goal is to prepare a leader or an organiza-
tion to execute specified tasks. It often includes repe-
tition of task, not unlike an athletic team learning to 
execute plays.”20 If we agree with the Army’s newest 
operating concept, then it is even more critical to 
invest in graduate school as a method to educate and 
develop strategic thinkers:
This concept, for the first time, focuses on 
all three levels of war; tactical, operational, 
and strategic. The environment the Army 
will operate in is unknown. The enemy is 
unknown, the location is unknown, and 
the coalitions involved are unknown. The 
problem we are focusing on is how to “Win 
in a Complex World.”21
In an unknown environment, leaders will not know 
what play to execute. They must be prepared to think 
through problems and respond to dynamic situations. 
Merely promoting the vague concept of leader develop-
ment is not enough. The Army must leverage all broad-
ening opportunities of its members to maximize the 
benefit to their strategic development. One such broad-
ening assignment is graduate school. As previously ar-
gued, advanced education is one of the best institutional 
mechanisms for developing strategic thinking. So where 
does the Army currently stand?
Senior Leader Trends
The logical starting point for a discussion fo-
cused on leader development is with those who 
have achieved the senior leadership positions of the 
organization. Within the Army, those positions are 
at the three- and four-star level. The Army’s officer 
management system is a closed hierarchy whereby 
the institution selects those its deems most qualified 
to advance. While the president, and ultimately the 
Senate, have final approval, the Army has great discre-
tion in selecting its senior leaders.22 Therefore, those 
it selects for promotion “reflect the character traits 
and leadership qualities that the organization seeks to 
sustain” and thus the “character traits the Army pre-
fers within the institution.”23 By reviewing the gradu-
ate school trends of the Army’s three- and four-star 
officers, we can get a glimpse of what the Army values 
and if changes have occurred. The database used for 
the study includes all three- and four-star officers who 
retired or served after 1986, including officers who 
commissioned as far back as year group 1943.24 The 
database uses standardized resume data that includes 
graduate degrees attained and the institution confer-
ring the degree. With approximately 500 observable 
datapoints (102 four-star and 391 three-star officers), 
the database offers a sizable basis for understanding 
the Army’s senior 




Over time, a mas-
ter’s degree has become 
necessary for advance-
ment, though it is not 
a formal requirement. 
While some career 
paths in the Army such 
as those of lawyers and 
doctors require a specific 
advanced degree, most 
do not. Where an officer 
acquires a degree is not 
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and civil-military relations 
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considered important. The Army considers a 
degree from Duke University in political sci-
ence to be equivalent to an online degree in any 
subject. There is no institutional mechanism 
in place to incentivize attaining a degree from 
a challenging program. Nor is there a require-
ment or incentive to attain a degree with rele-
vance to strategic leadership. All that matters is 
that an officer gets a graduate degree, preferably 
around the midcareer mark. Of the ninety-sev-
en four-star officers in the dataset used for this 
study, forty different graduate degree types 
have been attained out of a total of 130 earned 
graduate degrees (see table 1).25
Given the diversity of degrees at the 
senior-most level, it can be inferred that 
even greater diversity exists at lower ranks. 
If one accepts the universal benefit of grad-
uate school as the development of critical 
thinking, then the recommendation would 
simply be to expand the number of graduate 
school slots available for in-resident programs 
to maximize program benefits. If, however, 
the Army maintains or decreases its cur-
rent number of slots, then it must maximize 
utility. One method is to dictate specific 
degree programs. There is ample precedent 
in the Army’s history to support this course 
of action.26 In 1966, the Army commissioned 
a study titled “Report of the Department of 
the Army Board to Review Army Officer 
Schools” (later known as the Haines Board) 
that “stipulated that such training [graduate 
school] must be for recognized and specific 
Army requirements.”27 Today’s requirements 
(if enacted) should dictate that these pro-
grams be related to national security, interna-
tional relations, political science, or strategic 
studies.28 Of the degrees earned by the ob-
served four-star generals, 33 percent fall into 
the national security/strategic studies cate-
gory. The remaining 67 percent do not. This 
lends evidence to the importance of graduate 
school’s ability to develop strategic thinking 
skills regardless of degree program. A closer 
look at the Army’s current graduate programs 
will help illuminate a way forward.29
Table 1. Number and Percentage of Degrees 
by Type Earned by Four-Star Officers 
(Table by author)
Degree type Number of degrees earned
Percent of 
degrees earned
Administration (public) 13 10%
Administrative/personnel management 2 2%
Administrative education 3 2%
Advanced military studies 1 1%
Applied mechanics 1 1%
Area studies 1 1%
Business 1 1%
Business administration 8 6%
Business management 1 1%
Civil engineer 1 1%
Civil government 1 1%
Electronic warfare 1 1%
English 5 4%
History 6 5%
Human resources 1 1%
Information technology 2 2%
Instructional technology 1 1%
International relations 12 9%
International relations and economics 1 1%
Law 1 1%
Logistics management 4 3%
Management 5 4%
Master of arts 1 1%
Mathematics 1 1%
Mechanical engineering 3 2%
Military arts and science 9 7%
National resource strategy 1 1%
National security/strategic studies 20 15%
Nuclear engineering 1 1%
Operations research 3 2%
Philosophy 2 2%
Philosophy, politics, economics 2 2%
Physical education 1 1%
Physics 1 1%
Politics, economics, government 1 1%
Political science 6 5%
Psychology 3 2%
Public and international affairs 1 1%
Sociology 1 1%
Systems management 1 1%
Total 130 100%
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Current Graduate Programs
The U.S. Army’s current graduate studies program 
is composed of three major categories: Advanced Civil 
Schooling (ACS), Broadening Opportunity Program 
(BOP), and Retention Incentive. ACS has seven sub-
groupings: Acquisition, Basic Branch, Functional Area, 
Professor Army War College, PhD, Special Branch, 
and U.S. Military Academy.30 The groupings indicate 
the specific use of the degree and are mostly generated 
by funding allotments. For example, the U.S. Military 
Academy grouping provides a master’s degree to those 
who are en route to teach at the U.S. Military Academy 
at West Point, New York. Another major category is 
BOP. The four subgroupings under the BOP category 
include congressional fellow, Harvard strategist, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff intern, and scholarship. Much like the 
groupings under ACS, the BOP groupings indicate the 
intended use of the degree following completion.
Finally, the Retention Incentive category has three 
subgroupings. These include Expanded Graduate 
School Program, Graduate School for Active Duty 
Service Obligation, and Performance-Based Graduate 
School Incentive Program for Top-Performing Basic 
Branch Captain. The Retention Incentive groupings 
are intended as incentives to retain specific year 
groups or top performers. All the groupings within 
the three categories are fully funded by the Army. 
The other primary option for acquiring a graduate 
degree is tuition assistance. This option is utilized 
while the officer is working full-time and at his own 
expense. As such, it falls outside the scope of the 
research presented here.
Figure 2 is a visual representation of the Army’s 
three categories for officers to acquire a graduate degree 
paid for by the Army. This figure demonstrates trends 
over the last twenty years. The information is helpful 
for two reasons: it shows the trajectory and the total 
number of slots over time.
The key takeaway from figure 2 is the stagnant nature 
of graduate school slots over the past twenty years. This 
is especially true if one considers the new directive to pri-
oritize Army strategic leader development, ALDS 2013, 
was published in 2013. The year following the publica-
tion had a net decline in ACS slots. In other words, the 
rhetoric does not match the execution. Another point 
that stands out is the relatively low total number of pro-
gram slots. There have been on average fewer than five 
hundred ACS slots available per year since 1997. Figure 
3 (on page 114) highlights how this compares to the 
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Advanced civil schooling Broadening opportunity program
Figure 2. Army Graduate Program Slots Available by Year and Category
(Figure by author; data from U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 2017)
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figure also suggests a stagnant trajectory for program 
slots over the past eighteen years in the two primary 
strategic degree-producing categories: ACS and BOP. 
The number of graduate program slots is largely depen-
dent on the total officer end strength.
If the Army assumes that more strategic leadership 
will be required to face an increasingly ambiguous threat 
environment in the future, then the graduate slots avail-
able trend line should be increasing at a faster rate than 
the total officer population. The Army’s closed personnel 
system requires a “long time horizon to observe change 
in senior army leadership.”31 For example, officers who 
complete a graduate degree in 2017 are not eligible for 
senior leadership positions for at least a decade or more. 
It is thus imperative that the Army provide more gradu-
ate school opportunities at a faster rate. Figure 3 clearly 
shows that the graduate school slots available are in 
proportion to the number of available candidates. The 
percentage of slots available to the total population has 
averaged .64 percent since 1997.32 In 2015, that rate was 
.61 percent, slightly lower than the average.
An alternate demonstration of this data also sug-
gests that the total numbers of slots are too low. Table 
2 (on page 115) shows the number of active duty 
officers in the Army in 2015 by pay grade.
Those primarily eligible to attend graduate school are 
at the O-3 (captain) and O-4 (major) pay grade. Taking 
just the O-3 pay grade into consideration, the Army 
has around 29,000 officers and fewer than 600 graduate 
school slots available as demonstrated in figure 2 (on 
page 113). There are even fewer slots when the catego-
ries that will not reach the four-star level (such as special 
branch, functional area, and acquisition) are removed. 
In 2015, this would have generated 484 graduate school 
slots for a population of 29,166 (45,738 if you include 
those eligible at the O-4 pay grade).
This number of slots is simply too low when account-
ing for attrition, nonadvancement, and the increasing 
complexity of the threat environment. Junior leaders are 
increasingly asked to make decisions with potentially 
strategic-level impacts. Where a senior leader can rely on 
years of experience, a junior leader must rely on his ability 
to think critically. In-resident graduate programs provide 
officers the best environment to develop as critical think-
ers because such programs allow officers to set aside other 
tasks to focus entirely on building the skills of strategic 
leadership. To guarantee a greater likelihood of success at 
the strategic level, the Army must provide more in-resi-
dent graduate school opportunities.
Civilian versus Military Degree-
Producing Programs
How important is the difference between civilian and 
military degree-producing programs? Does it matter if an 
officer receives his only graduate degree from a military 
school? At set points in an officer’s career he will attend 
military schools. Examples include CGSC and the Army 
War College. Over time, these schools have become 
accredited and are capable of conferring graduate degrees. 
Officers attending military schools have the option of 
Graduate slots (advanced civil 






































Figure 3. Army Officer Total and Graduate Program Slots Available by Year 
(Figure by author, data from http://www.cna.org/research/pop-rep)
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increasing their workload in order to pursue an advanced 
degree. In short, they are not mandated to complete the 
requirements for a graduate degree but have the option. 
Recently, the Army determined that all officers would at-
tend intermediate level education in some capacity with 
the top 50 percent of majors attending CGSC as resi-
dents.33 This increase in students resulted in a subsequent 
increase in faculty and capability for the school to confer 
graduate degrees. Many officers with limited flexibility 
in their career timeline will take advantage of the degree 
offering while foregoing an opportunity to complete an 
advanced degree at a civilian institution. Recall that the 
source and type of the master’s degree is not institution-
ally important if critical thinking is the most import-
ant goal. If, however, the Army seeks to maximize the 
graduate school experience to develop strategic leaders, 
these leaders “must be schooled in matters both military 
and political” in order to become “masters of the geopolit-
ical realm.”34 Military officers will receive other forms of 
professional military education throughout their careers 
that will make them experts in the warfighting domain.35 
Graduate education is the best opportunity to train them 
in the geopolitical context necessary for strategic leaders. 
If degree-producing military schools balance their curric-
ulum to include a healthy dose of international relations, 
political science, security studies, etc., then any trends 
toward officers only obtaining their degree from military 
schools will not be inherently negative.
The resume dataset highlights degree trends among 
Army senior leaders. The data is divided into three 
categories: officers who obtained a degree only from 
military schools, officers who obtained a degree only 
from civilian schools, and officers who have obtained 
a degree from both a military and a civilian school. A 
simple time-series line graph represents the data shown 
in figure 4 (on page 116). It should be noted that the 
youngest active duty four-star generals are from year 
group 1982. Therefore, the data will drop because only 
three-star generals are represented after 1982.
The results of the data show that there is a decreasing 
trend in attaining a degree only from a civilian institu-
tion, with a corresponding increase in acquiring a degree 
from a military institution. There is also an increasing 
trend in attaining a degree from both a civilian and mil-
itary institution. Army senior leaders are still obtaining 
degrees from civilian institutions but are also more likely 
to get a degree from a military institution.
The results of figure 4 show a positive trend toward 
the central goal of this research: to provide the U.S. 
Army feedback to better understand the results of its cur-
rent graduate school policy. Military institutions control 
their curriculum and can tailor it to precisely develop 
strategic leaders. However, the benefits of allowing 
military officers to broaden themselves at civilian 
institutions cannot be overstated. Thus, a combination 
of attending both is optimal. Current trends indicate 
progress in this regard. The follow-up question then 
becomes whether this was intentional. The Army can 
benefit from a holistic approach to generating strategic 
leaders by encouraging attendance at civilian institu-
tions through an increase in the total number of slots 
available. Additionally, other structural changes in the 
Army’s OPMD would be necessary to institutionally 
incentivize attending a civilian graduate school. This 
would ensure a larger pool of officers with a formal 
critical-thinking foundation is available to draw on.
Options for the Future
The Army has always striven to develop leaders. 
Various programs and structural changes have been 
implemented to adjust training to reflect contemporary 
threats. Today’s ambiguous threat environment requires 
another shift focused on developing strategic leaders. 
The above research has identified several weaknesses in 
Table 2. Active Component Commissioned Officer 
Corps by Pay Grade for Fiscal Year 2015
(Table by author, data from http://www.cna.org/research/pop-rep)
Pay grade O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 O-7 O-8 O-9 O-10 Total
Total 8,132 12,181 29,166 16,572 9,302 4,201 139 126 48 11 79,878
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the Army’s use of graduate school to maximize strategic 
leader competency. There are, however, three approach-
es that can help maximize the Army’s strategic leader 
development process: the Junior Officer Strategic Leader 
Development Program (JOSLDP), Scales’s 350 method, 
and a culture shift toward education.36
Option 1: JOSLDP. In 2007, Maj. Larry Burris 
published a paper on how to best develop strategic 
leaders. His central finding was that a centrally se-
lected, four-year program focused on a small group of 
officers (twenty to thirty per year) would be the best 
approach to identify and develop the Army’s future 
strategic leaders. The JOSLDP approach would select 
the best strategic candidates from across the Army. 
The candidates would then complete their military 
education (possibly attaining a graduate degree from a 
military institution) in their first year of the program. 
Year two would be spent in a civilian graduate school 
“resulting in a master’s level degree in strategy, national 
security studies or foreign affairs,” whereby the thesis 
project would “have to address a strategic issue cur-
rently being faced.”37 Year three would consist of service 
as an intern on the joint or Army staff, and year four 
would be in a non-Department of Defense agency.
The JOSLDP approach coincides with the research 
presented here in several aspects. Hand-selecting the 
best officers for the program will generate an incentive 
and promote the seriousness of the Army with respect 
to developing strategic leaders. This approach will 
also overcome the deficiencies of program slots tied to 
population density by forcing officers to focus exten-
sively on strategy-related degrees. Finally, the approach 
intentionally builds on the success identified by sending 
officers to both a military and civilian institution for 
graduate degree completion.
Option 2: Scales’s 350 method. A more recent 
approach, published in 2016 by retired Maj. Gen. 
Robert Scales, “seeks to guarantee that only those 
gifted with strategic genius become strategic deci-
sionmakers and commanders.”38 To accomplish this, 
Scales’s method counsels selecting about 350 young 
officers to attend a civilian graduate school “to study 
the art of war.”39 After graduate school, they would 
attend the School of Advanced Military Studies in 
residency for two years in order to meet the “require-
ments for a PhD in strategic studies.”40 Later in their 
career, the cohort would attend another version of 
the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. 
Army War College. The program should be rigorous 
and supervised by the highest levels of the Army 
staff. Additionally, Scales argues that there should 
be a set number of duty position quotas to ensure 
members of the program are placed into strategic 
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Figure 4. Graduate Degrees Awarded by Year Group 
and Type for Three- and Four-Star Officers
(Figure by author)
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would winnow out all but the best and justifies 350 
officers as the starting number.
 Scales’s 350 method differs from the JOSLDP in 
several ways. The Scales method places officers in 
positions to utilize their strategic expertise between 
schooling, whereas the JOSLDP is a continuous four-
year program. Scales’s approach seeks to groom strat-
egists over the length of a career and therefore many 
more initial applicants would need to be accepted to 
account for attrition. The method ensures strategic 
thinkers will reach the senior-leader level because of 
the size of the candidate pool. Similar to the JOSLDP 
approach, Scales’s 350 method seeks to dictate the 
graduate degree program into a strategic studies 
field. It also seeks to expand the number of graduate 
students to meet future demand. Finally, the approach 
seeks to maximize the benefits of both civilian and 
military graduate degree institutions.
Option 3: Culture shift toward education. The 
goal of this option is to formally recognize civilian 
graduate education as critical to developing strategic 
leaders capable of winning in a complex world. To 
execute this plan, additional resources need to be 
allocated to increase the number of officers attending 
fully funded, in-resident graduate schools. The num-
ber of slots should not be tied to population density 
but rather the needs of the force. To accommodate an 
increase in midcareer officers rotating out of tactical 
units, the OPMD should be restructured. These up-
dates would include an increase in the total number of 
Lt. Gen. Paul E. Funk II (left), then commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, and Iraqi Maj. Gen. Najm 
Abdullah al-Jibouri (right), commander of Nineveh Liberation Operation, walk through a busy market 4 October 2017 near the University 
of Mosul. Funk attended Montana State University where he received a bachelor’s degree in speech communications and earned a Reserve 
Officers’ Training Corps commission as an armor officer. Later, Funk earned a master’s degree in administration from Central Michigan 
University, and his most recent educational experience was as a War College Fellow at the University of Texas Institute for Advanced Tech-
nologies. (Photo by Spc. Avery Howard, U.S. Army)
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officers at the O-3 and O-4 pay grade, incentives for 
promotion for officers who attain degrees from both 
civilian and military schools, incentives for advance-
ment for degrees attained in specific fields deemed 
critical to strategic leadership, and the removal of year 
groups to allow officers a utilization tour following 
graduate school completion. These structural changes 
will incentivize advanced education and influence a 
culture shift toward education.
Final Thoughts
There is inherent tension between preparing for 
the tactical fight (training) and dedicating time to 
learning how to think critically (education). If leader 
development is the Army’s priority, then the organi-
zation has a responsibility to clearly articulate how 
much of each category is desired. This article has 
demonstrated the Army’s consistent commitment 
to graduate school opportunities. It has also revealed 
trends among its senior leaders. The Army can use this 
data to fine-tune its policies to meet emerging needs. 
The periodic cycles of tactical versus critical thinking 
skills is again at the forefront of conversation because 
of the changing threat environment.41 Army doctrine 
and rhetoric from senior leaders is pointing toward 
critical-thinking skills rather than tactical.
This research article focused on the graduate 
school aspect of developing strategic leaders and 
determined three key areas of improvement. First, 
the Army must provide more graduate school op-
portunities.42 An increase in the pool of officers with 
a graduate degree in strategic studies increases the 
probability of promoting to the senior-leader level 
someone with a related degree. Secondly, careful 
consideration should be given to maximize the utili-
ty of graduate school degrees earned by officers. This 
may include dictating the degree earned. Finally, the 
Army must take a deliberate approach to encourage 
and incentivize graduate degree completion at both 
military and civilian schools.
Three approaches were outlined that would 
facilitate a solution to this article’s central research 
goal of providing the U.S. Army feedback to better 
understand the results of its current graduate school 
policy. The approaches can be integrated with various 
structural and budgetary changes.
Because leader development is a central goal of the 
Army to address future national security issues, every 
aspect of the process must be analyzed. This article was 
an effort to analyze the graduate school portion of that 
process for senior officers. Graduate school can deliver the 
foundation necessary to win today and tomorrow.   
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